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$r_{bhC}$ O $\#\ll y.pce_{h}\triangleright\nu 0^{\gamma}h^{s}b_{1}d_{t}V^{t\ell lfn}+$
$au\{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{b^{t}}$ $q\tau^{p}\theta^{t0^{t\eta}}\backslash$ ,
$\mu A\mathfrak{t}\iota.\}t_{\wedge}i\cdot n\ell\gamma_{\iota\eta}90r\uparrow nP^{rubh}mj$ a $fem^{p_{b}}+_{llp4}^{\backslash A}\cdot$
$.\iota$ $h_{\alpha}rWO$-player $on\neq\epsilon id.\circ 4’-,jGane\epsilon$ of Deception. Two $n\iota m$. $bersx_{1}..$ and $x_{2}$ aoe $Ao\mathfrak{g}e\dot{n}$
$rightarrow\overline{b}$\={O}m $[0,1]$ by mean8 of independent $biva.ri\Re e$ unifom $di\epsilon tribution$ on $[0,1]^{2}$ . $P1_{W}\alpha$ Inow
look8 at the number8 privately and cho.oe$u$ one of the two and open8it to Plap $n$, rd
the other numbe.r $iaco\backslash rered$. $P1_{\mathfrak{B}^{f}}er\Pi$ then accept.\S either one $d$ the opened $numb\alpha$ or the
coverU number, and $rec6iv\infty bm$ plyer Ithe number he. acceptU. $P1_{W}er$ I $(\Pi)_{:}aem$ to
$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ $(\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT})$ the $\infty e\alpha ed$ payoff to II.
In Baston and $B\infty to\ (R\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}.[1])$ it i\S provm that the $\S trate\dot{y}\infty j$
$\sigma$
. : $Ch\infty\epsilon e$ the nearut number to $\#$ mong $x_{1}mdx_{2}$ , and open it. The other $numb\alpha$
$i\epsilon$ covered.
for Iand
$\tau^{*}$ : Accept the opend $(\infty verd)$ number if it $i\S>(<)_{2}^{1}$ ,
for $n$, congtitute an optimal $\epsilon trategy-p\dot{u}r$, and the value of the $gmei\epsilon 7/12$.
By S&guchi $(Rd.[5])$ it $i\epsilon$ proven that, if $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ are independent $biv\alpha iate.\epsilon tandard$
nomd $di\S\aleph^{bution}$ in $(-\infty,\infty)^{1}$ , then the above strateg-pair $\sigma$ and $\tau$ with $\#$ oeplacd
by $0,$ $i\epsilon$ optimU, and the wlue of the $gmei\epsilon*_{l}- 2-2\approx 0.2337$ .
$wi\dot{than}identicdp.d|f|^{-}P1ayerIobservae‘(X_{1}^{r},X_{l})andAoO8ae.hi\S de\ddot{m}onnu.mb\varpi\theta_{1}\in 18I^{I}wo-p1ayer_{arrowarrow\prime}Tw\propto sidedrGane\epsilon ofDeception$. $LetX_{1,}X_{2},Y_{\iota,}Y_{2}are|.|.d.r.v.\epsilon$
$[0,1]$ . Player II $obs\varpi ve8$ ($Y_{1}$ ,Y2) and&ooe\infty his $de\dot{Q}8ionnumb\propto\theta_{2}\in[0,1]$:Rch $p1_{\mathfrak{B}^{r}}\alpha’\epsilon$
Aoice of his $d\dot{m}$ion number $i\epsilon mde$ independently of the opponmt’\S Anice.
$P1_{W}er$ I $choo8ae$ the nearaet number $to\cdot\theta_{1}$ mong $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ and $op\alpha\iota$ it and the $oth\alpha$
nunber $i\epsilon$ coveoed. Player II Aooeae the $neare8t$ number to $\theta_{2}$ mong $y_{1}$ and $y_{2}$ and $\varphi m$ it
$nd$ the other number $i\epsilon$ coveoed. $BD’\epsilon$ opened $numberis\sim>(<)\theta_{1}$ , then 1 $get\epsilon P’\epsilon$ opened
(covered) number. If I’8 opened number i8 $>(<)\theta_{l}$ , then $n$ get8 I’8 opend (covwed)
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$\#\emptyset U$ 2\mu (Xt,. $x_{t}t4_{P}\alpha\cdot b_{i^{\nu}a\gamma\iota’\wedge}6\gamma.\sqrt{}\sigma b\mathcal{E}y^{i\eta}f$ ‘ $\mu+et\alpha_{f}$
$5J^{\alpha me^{*}\nu\downarrow\dot{\zeta}}dit^{4_{ti}but\iota\triangleright r}’\cdot.I${ l. o\mbox{\boldmath $\omega$}h*AJ $hr(\mathfrak{l})b_{l\nu_{Anaf*\iota}}..\iota\nu.f_{0lb}$
$mlf^{l})b\dot{s}\sqrt ttt’bu_{\hslash 0-n}u_{d}t.ik\downarrow\cdot\Lambda$.
the $1\infty$ corrdeted if between the two component $vuiab1\infty$ , the more $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}\propto bve$ player
I’l $dec\epsilon ption$ becomu, $at$ leut, when the corrdahon il $opp\dot{d}$tdy -rected It is $d\cdot 0$ shovrn that,
br (2) if independenc6 is arumed, the vdue of the gme il ($2-02/\sqrt{2\pi}=$ 0.2337.
$|.\dagger t(/-l\hslash,)(|\sim ZX_{t_{*}})$ $(\gamma_{l,}x_{t})\zeta\hat{\llcorner}O,$ $l]^{L}$
, I $7|\leq 1$
$\overline{\iota\tau\sqrt{\vdash\ell^{b}}}\eta_{2}$
. . $- \frac{1}{u_{l’f}}iJr_{X_{I}^{l}\wedge 2}\ell^{f_{1}\chi_{l}*X_{l}^{f}),(,_{1}X_{f})},\cdot\epsilon\int-\Re_{l}4)^{A}$, $|(^{l<I}$ .
$r_{f^{Am\{v_{A}\ \iota 1}}\{f\not\in h8^{\backslash \iota}f^{\llcorner}$ $\nu fiz-(Vz\alpha)\gamma$,
$\{1-\rho-\sqrt{2(1-\rho)}+\sqrt{1-\beta}\}\phi(0)-2\rho.[_{\mathfrak{n}}^{\infty}\Phi(r_{2})\Phi(\frac{\rho x}{\sqrt{1-\rho^{2}}},)dx_{2}.$
$\iota\#_{-l}.\S t\neq J^{\hslash}\#\eta_{d}f$
.5 i‘.[.$3\dot{3},[\overline{4}-\simarrow]$ . M
$(\cdot|)$ $f(x_{1},x_{2})=e^{-(\bullet\iota+l)}:\{1+\gamma(2e^{-\bullet\iota}-1)(2e^{-\iota}’-1)\},(r_{1},x_{2})\in\langle 0,\infty)^{2}$
$wh\epsilon re\gamma,$ $|\gamma|\leq 1,$ be agiven $con\epsilon tant$ . It $\dot{r}$ ouily $\epsilon ecn$ thu $f(r_{1},r_{2})i\epsilon\epsilon ymtric$ with
identicd mginal pdf $g(ae)=e^{-\bullet},0\leq oe<\infty$ , and that the corrolation $c_{Q\mathfrak{g}}fflci\epsilon nt\dot{u}$ oqual
to $(1/4)\gamma.$ This bivuiate pdf $i_{8}$ one of the $\epsilon implc\epsilon t$ onc that $huid\epsilon nticd\alpha pon\varpi ti\triangleleft$
mrginalg and $\underline{correlatcd}$ component variablu. $\ulcorner ot(’ I)\mathfrak{a}_{\sim\iota}A$
the bivariato normd
(4..)
$f( r_{1}, x_{2})=\frac{1}{\sigma_{1}}\phi.(\frac{x_{1}-\mu\iota}{\sigma_{1}})\cdot\frac{1}{\sigma_{2}}\emptyset(\frac{x_{2}-\mu_{2}}{\sigma_{2}})’(x_{1}, r_{2})\in(-\infty, \infty)^{2}$ ,
(i.e., uymmtric but independent), an optimd $\epsilon trateg$-pair would be diﬄcult to flnd.
$K$ . $5\iota_{l^{utnt_{1\alpha}}}.\theta\ell k.\nu t\emptyset nqa\mathfrak{l}WC.$ [Ref. $S^{\cdot}$]
Th$\bullet$ $cl-\iota dcdfi_{1}11\cdot infomrtion$ but.cholc$\bullet$ problom $flr dilcu\iota\cdot\bullet d\Psi Gilb\bullet rt\bullet nd$
$M\alpha tdl\bullet rln$ 19664 oetondod to $\bullet$ zoro–lum $biht\bullet rd\iota\bullet qu\bullet ntidgm\bullet\psi introdudn_{l}$ rn oppo.
nont $phyQr(I)$ who loob $\bullet t\bullet uqu\bullet ncootr.v’.\iota p\dot{\mathfrak{n}}v\bullet tdy\bullet nd$ dddu $wh\bullet th\bullet r$ to $uop\bullet n$’ or
$u\infty v\bullet r^{\hslash}\bullet uhr.v$ . $Ho1\iota$ Ulowod to covor $\bullet tm\infty tm$ timr. If th$\bullet$ $\cdot t\bullet B\bullet udut_{P^{1}}w\bullet rn$) $\bullet CCep4$
$\bullet$ $r.v$. $h\bullet$ rrdvr $kom$ I $hi\cdot uc\bullet ptd$ vrrirble, nnd Ihe $1^{rm\cdot 4r\min\iota tu}$. lf $P$ rejut$\bullet$ $\bullet$ $r.v.$ ,
th$\bullet$ $grm\bullet 1\cdot$ continud to $th\bullet$ noel $\infty und\iota ta\#\ln_{l}$ with th$\bullet$ noet $r.v$ . $prlv-t\bullet lyob Qrvu$ by $l$.
$P1_{W}\circ r1(ll)$ wantl $b$ minimi$\bullet\bullet$ $(m\dot{r}mir\bullet)$ th$\bullet$ $\bullet xpoctdp\bullet y_{\Phi}l$ to $l1$. Por thil $m$-opportunity
$n-\infty und\iota\bullet quenti\bullet 1_{l}rm\bullet,$ $\bullet n$ optimd $\cdot trrt\bullet y\cdot pair$ of th$\bullet$ $p1_{V}\cdot rl\bullet nd$ th$\bullet$ vtlu$\bullet$ $Q\iota\iota h\bullet_{C^{am\bullet\bullet r}}$.
found $\hslash re\bullet n\bullet rd$ diltrlbution of Iho $udlqu\bullet nce$ of $r.v.’\iota$ . lt $b$ lhown $lh\bullet tund\bullet r$ tho optlmU
$p1_{W}pl\bullet y\bullet rI$ docdvu $hi$. opponont, i.e. $cov\bullet r$. tho $r.v$. if it $i\iota vQ y\iota\varpi nuw\cdot 11u1f$ it $i\iota$
$\infty n\cdot id\bullet r\bullet bly1\bullet rg\bullet$. Two $\bullet xmplurr\bullet\dot{g}v\bullet n$ to lUutrlt$\bullet$ the procdur$\bullet$ $\mathfrak{t}o$ derlve th$\bullet$ $\iota.olution$ of
th$\bullet$ $gam\bullet$ . $lt4\bullet hown$ , for Rple, that $wh\bullet n$ Iho $\alpha Rtrlbution$ $b$ unifom in $[0,1]$ , $\bullet ndn=12,$
.
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II can get 0.8126, 0.7561, 0.7067, if $m=l,$ $2$ , $, rupectively, although he can get 0.8791 if
his opponent is not $a\mathbb{I}owd$ to cover (i.e. $m=0$) $.$ Finw $\iota h\bullet$ Poisson-arrival $nr\dot{t}on$ of the
continuous-time sequential gme with a $\dot{y}v\epsilon n$ final time is also formulated and solved.
$\urcorner r_{r}5^{\text{ }x\dot{\Phi}\iota_{\hslash}}\ell:J_{\overline{l}\prime}m\overline{.}\text{ }r\simeq/ZjJ$ :
$u_{W}^{()}’=00467,$ $v_{1}=06897_{1}v_{11}^{(l)}=0.7410$, and $\beta_{1}=0.07\theta\theta$
.Gane value is $v_{1l}^{()}’=0.7067_{1}$
$wher\epsilon$ the horlgontd lhe $\iota cgentr\epsilon pRt$. the $abd fa$ of $0\leqqleqq 1$, and $kr,$ $k*rnd\triangleright m$
$\sim.m\bullet an\backslash ’.arrow|$ ihe dmon-pdr $opon- roj\epsilon ct,$ $op\epsilon n$-ucept and m-m.$k$ with $<\beta,\beta>,.ru.p.\bullet Gti.v\psi$.
:ON $?w\alpha PERSON$ “ﬄAL” $Pom$ BY $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$
$P1_{W}m1$ rd $norA$ant$\bullet$ 1 unit and $u66ach$ dealt a $u_{h\dot{a}nd}$”, nmely, a randomly $ch\infty Qn$ rod number in $[0,1]$ .$EaA$ sees $hi\epsilon$ , but not other’s hand. First I bets any mount $(\geqq 0)h\bullet$ chooses. Naxt $U$deddm whether $h\bullet\infty$ the bet or folds. The $payoff\dot{u}uu\epsilon ud$. Hence the $rul\bullet$ of the gmcis dmcrib$d$ by the diagram (in which $sgnz\underline{=}1(z>0),$ $0(z=0),$ $or-1(z<0)$):
The soluti $ningen\infty uly$ suggmted by Richard Ballmam and proved by Newman is $l\theta$$foUm$: An optimal strategy for I is, when $h\dot{u}$ hnd $\dot{u}x$ , to bet
$\beta\cdot(x)=$
$Th\bullet optimdstrrteybrn\dot{uto}\epsilon\infty th\epsilon I’ sb\epsilon t,\beta,ifan.don1ifhb1-(12/7)(\beta+2)^{-\iota}$. $Thevdueofthegmei\epsilon l/\backslash 7.(n+[2]\}hndy\alpha\infty d\epsilon$
Figure 1 describes this optimal strategy-pair.. Newman pointd out the $foUowing$ two
$lnt\bullet r\infty ting$ points:
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(1) $n_{\epsilon}’$ strategy is $featurele\epsilon s$ . He merely sees the bet if his hand is good enough. I’s
strategy, on the other hand, is very slick. He very systematically and boldly bluth on
$0<\varpi<1/7$ . Pbr example he bets $\rho*(0.142815)=200(cf.1/7=0.i4285f)$, which would
$\underline{o}\underline{th}_{\frac{erwi\epsilon eco}{--}}.....\cdot r.\underline{r}e.sondto\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} the\epsilon uer\underline{bhand}x=0.99996_{-arrow--}----\sim.\cdot.\cdot.$. $–\sim--\cdot-\cdot\cdot-$
(2) $T\tilde{h}e$ number 7 is present in an essential way in the $\epsilon 0\overline{l}utlon$ . (The $\infty\sigma plan\dot{a}tion.$.of Ihismysticd appearance is not gtven.)
$ba\mathfrak{p}P^{\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{A\phi h}}$ Ca $plt$}$\not\subset M\iota 1\eta\iota p’ 7fo$ taes $frD^{\mu}’ A\iota\# relre_{4J0\hslash S_{1}}.$’
$(\alpha)$ X $\ wdJw\iota tRh_{\lambda}\prime u_{[\theta|]},$ . $(b)$ payoff $\dot{u}$ deflned by $s\ell n(x-y)Uld$
(c) player 1 is $aUowed$ to choose an ubltr$uy$ real amount of bet. Once either $0,$$f$ the
three is removed, the pmesence of the number 7 in the solution disappears.
$Rr_{\phi au\mu},$
$\psi_{\theta\zeta c)}h\prime t\ell r^{A\omega(b_{y}((\beta^{\psi)}}c^{r}J\cdot\iota.S\kappa:\hslash l.cf\cdot c\nu 1bi\downarrow f$
$\theta t\uparrow^{0f_{1\{_{1\propto.mPh}}}..nft^{\mathfrak{g}}C\Gamma_{\eta 2\mu m.|\searrow 3^{i}4rA7}’,.\cdot\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{b}.\{j^{Ab\{|S|-_{g}^{L}4-\cdot\iota^{1}\frac{\pi}{r}i-O.*u\alpha\prime}t^{1}l^{l}s,\iota_{fre}i_{\frac{\dagger}{-}qt^{\iota b4}}\llcorner.c_{\tau^{\underline{l}}}rr)=$
’
$q$. $lt\iota\epsilon$
$\rho_{n\sigma \text{ }tr}$ $\text{ _{}k’’}\theta\iota^{*}S’$. $hsJ\omega u\Leftrightarrow rhd(d$ ) $u_{kIP^{1r^{\varphi}}}\cdot t\alpha \mathfrak{W}I\omega/J,$
$\iota.f^{+r4}TZ$ $ or $X>_{J}$ . $\cdot\uparrow nef$) $\iota s\wedge Al_{A}\zeta^{a}$) $\sim\zeta d$ ), $\wedge\lambda_{f}l\eta ltm^{k}$ $\phi\iota_{n\sigma\hslash_{f_{j}}}$
$lm\gamma$ ; $\nu\iota\triangleright V’$ ‘ $nu\eta$ $r$ . $W\iota_{CA\hslash}$ ro\nu e;






The optimd strategy for IJ $is$ to see the $I’\epsilon$ bet $\beta$, if and $on\psi$ ff his hand $y$ exceeds.
$y_{0}(\beta.)=1-(3/2)/(2+\beta)$ . The $vdu\epsilon$ of the game is 1/4.
$\beta i(x)$ $h^{*}(x)$ $\underline{\nu o(\beta)}-\cdot-$
$u|^{\backslash }/$ $r\{_{\ell\gamma}*\epsilon t$ , $nffo\sigma b_{lpr\nu\epsilon}$ betO $\int I$ ) $a_{\eta}d(a$. $),$ $n,$ $r\cap t_{t\iota Y\backslash },d$ 1 $p”\acute{u}_{\acute{W}}$
$Y^{A}t^{S4|w},’\sim$ \nu $k_{\ell}ot\alpha nf^{S}$ 1
$\tau h$ S\rho 0\sim $e\wedge\nu_{1}\mu$ .
$*e,ve\delta n\iota’;kn\nu\backslash \star A^{\backslash }‘;.b\cdot b\triangleright\triangleright\hslash|n\vee A\iota-*If$.
$Yku\mu i.a\overline{\alpha}hi;hif^{hl\epsilon f\grave{l}jrt^{\zeta k}\nearrow?S}\triangleright nll\wedge\omega h_{t}4\iota_{\iota f\omega\circ-\# dn’\mathfrak{k}l\eta\iota k_{?\propto f^{qfqr\prime}rightarrow}}’.\cdot$
2 ? ( $\{.[\xi],$ $[\eta]$ )
$o_{\dot{n}}Wr4Arightarrow Hem$ be $t$ Co $hmi\Psirightarrow$ A &play$\propto$ $($- $m\dot{M})$ committee
has $pla\mathfrak{g}|m1,$ $D$ and $m$. The $\infty m\dot{m}tt\infty$ wmte to $mpl\varphi$ one mong $n$ ;\mbox{\boldmath $\varphi$}1
cents. It interviewe applir sequmtially oneby-one. Facing each applicmt player $I(\Pi$,
m) evaluates the $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} mt$ ability at $X_{1}(Y_{1}, Z_{1})$ and oomputer ability at $X_{2}(Y_{l}, Z_{2})$ .
Evaluatim by the playm are made indepmdntly and each $P^{}\nu oe$ chooeee, $Rm$ hls
evaluatim, $\dot{\alpha}th\varpi$ one of $R$ and A. The committee’s choice $i\epsilon$ made by simple majority.. If
the eomthittee rejects the $flr\epsilon tn-lapphcm_{4}$ thm it should rpt the $*happUcrt$.
$D\varpi ot_{G}$
(1.1) $\epsilon\approx x_{1}\wedge$. $oea,\eta<y\iota\wedge n,$ $\zeta=z_{1}\wedge z_{l}$.
If the ecmmittee accepts an applicsnt Wtth talenta evaluated at $ry,z$ by I, $n,$ $m$, re .,
thn the game $\epsilon to\mu$ and each $pla\nu oe$ is paid $\xi$ , $n,C$ to $I$, Il, $m$ reep.. If the cornmitteo
rejects an $-pplicaffi$, then the $mt$ applicaffi is interviewed and the $gm\epsilon\infty ntinuu$. $R$
olaver of the $\infty m\dot{m}$tt\infty a to $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} the\infty oetdpayoff$ he can get.
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’The two different kinds of talents ($man_{B^{emenl}}$ and cbmputer $Alllti\infty$) tar eaca $a\mu pu-$
caffi, $ue$ bivriate r.v.s, ii.d. vith pdf
(1.2) $h(x_{1},xa)=1+\gamma(1-2x_{1})[1-h_{2}),$
$\forall(x_{1\prime}x_{l})e[0,1]^{2},$ $|\gamma|\leq 1$
.We dffine $u\gamma=\mathfrak{B}\infty tae.,p.gffi$. player 1 can $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ , if I is in state $(j,*y,z)$ md dl $p1_{W}m$
$P^{1\eta ophmg_{y\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}}}$ .
Ddine $v_{f}$ , in $\Pi$, md $wg$ , far $m,$ in$i\iota 11uu4$. Moreover we $\dot{m}bodu\infty$ a number
$c\underline{=}\ ( \xi)=2\int_{0}^{1}dx_{1}[_{0}^{1}x_{l}\hslash(x_{1\prime}x_{2})\Phi\approx\frac{1}{3}+_{a}\neg\iota_{0}$
$.wh\alpha\epsilon\Phi$ in $|\theta/10,11/30|br\forall\gamma\in[-1,1]$ .
The $r\eta\Re uaBon$ of $our*_{P}i_{\eta\epsilon rkcho1\infty kgt_{R}egm\epsilon t}$
(1.3) $(u_{j},v_{f},wg)=\ _{yr\iota_{\iota}},\lfloor Ex_{F^{4c e\text{\’{e}}}}.\Psi\eta\nu\# s+_{\mathfrak{g}tib}sn_{\dot{f}\prime}(l, g_{1})]$




$(1.6)$ $M_{gR}(x,y,z)\approx$ R n $u,$ $v,$ $wu$, $v,$ $\{$
A \Pi $u,$ $v,$ $w$ $\xi,$ $\eta$ ,
$u, v, w u, v, w$
$u, v, w$ \xi, \eta,$
(1.6) $M_{fA}(\sim y,z)=$
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because of the simple majority rule.
$(omittd.W\circ tl.aethk.\infty nvBnhmh\alpha m\lrcorner t\epsilon rt\infty\prime whennffidheaAoeu,the\epsilon ub\mathfrak{g}\alpha iptj+lofuf+\iota,v_{j+1},w_{J+l}is-$ . $)$
$\underline{\tau}f^{\tau 5}du’\dagger hd.\hslash_{Y}$ I in gtate $0,x,y,r$), $R(A)dom|natu$A (R), $v_{l}f+\iota>(<)\xi|*$
$J1.f^{\hslash_{\lrcorner_{\sim}}}.’ n..’\ldots.f\varphi$ for $n\mathfrak{M}.$. , $.u_{f+}..\iota$ and




$W_{C}P^{t}\iota vd$ : $\Phi nmd$ rcaegd payoff to 1 $\epsilon ah\iota fiu$ the $r$
$\tau\iota_{f}\approx Q(u;+\iota),$ $\forall j\epsilon[1,\mathfrak{n}-1],*=c$ ,
k
$Q(u)arrow u$ [l–$(f(u)) $+2(f(u))^{\theta}$] $+(f(u))^{2}(c-2g(u))+2f(u)g(u)$.
$l$
$\mathfrak{u}_{\mathfrak{l}}>\mathfrak{u}_{l}>$
. . , $>\mu_{\hslash-\int}7^{u_{h}-C}-$ .
$b\tau r.g_{A}A\nu 0ruhm\alpha_{J}bPl0$ $\mathfrak{d}7/O$, $\lambda m_{A}t_{l}.\gamma uffl_{A}$
Ddine the state $(n, a,y, z)$ to meen that the committee $\epsilon vUuffiae$ the $p\iota m$ applicant
$\text{ }x\{y,$ $z$) $byI(n, m)md\mathfrak{n}-lu\dot{m}ntd\vee\sim m$ \Psi phrm if U prr pphA
fs $r\epsilon i$rtul bv the ecmumittm.
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Let $EQV$($=eq$. value) for the $n\triangleleft t*e$ game be $(u_{n},v_{\mathfrak{n}},w_{n})$. Then the Optimdity Eqtl&
tion $i\epsilon$
$Q|)$ $(u_{n},v_{n’}w_{*\iota})=E_{-,y.\iota}\infty V$ of $M_{n}(x,y,z)],$ $(n \geq 1,u_{1}=v_{1}=w_{1}=\frac{1}{2})$ ,
where the payoffmztin $M_{n}(x,y,z)$ in state $(n,x,y,z)$ is represented by
$(_{\backslash }t_{1}a)$
$\int.tf)$ $M_{n,R}(ae,y,z)=$
$1^{\iota}$. $t$) $M_{ A}(s,y,z)=$
$(_{Conv\epsilon ntionhg\underline{r}effi\alpha too,ifnoed\circ d}^{bmc\epsilon 11,the\iota ub\epsilon\propto iptn-1du_{n-\iota},v_{\hslash-1,w_{n-1}}}$. is omitted. We me $tb)$
$I\{|.t;I7$ OWh
$k4\theta u_{\hslash}\uparrow u(sr-\iota 0(\mathfrak{u}^{3}-4^{l})*(Ppa\prime wke\prime\prime ujJ\backslash \mu h|\prime t^{ut\iota\cdot\iota t}L)U-\#=0,$ $r_{h}C_{a1}^{4}y_{3}ofifr’\neq^{L}$
.
$C_{b^{h\not\in r}}\iota\cdot f\iota\uparrow’.an\partial*\cdot\triangleright u$
If the odd-man appears, and has some power of arbitration the committee stands at dis-
$advgt*G$, in the sm that its gain $u_{\Phi}\langle p$) $-21$ decreases $up\in[0$ , } $]$ in$\varpi m$ . The
commttee gete leu, $u$ odd-man’s power of arbitration becomes stronger. $5e\iota b\{[f]$.
$RPF.\overline{\epsilon}..\kappa\ldots.\S.\overline{N}C\epsilon s\backslash \cdot-\cdot-\cdot--\cdot$ .
[1] De eption $gam$es, Int. J. of Game Th., 17 (1989), $|at\cdot[\not\supset\#$.
$[\not\subset]$ A $\kappa odtAfor^{\ell l}red^{\alpha}PoKpt0p\prime r$ . $\triangleright t.(|\eta yq)$. $JS7-Pto$.
$8\gamma M.\sigma aK\triangleright 3^{u}4\downarrow.[3]\sim[?0‘$
[3] $M$ ntk. $J_{4P^{0t)}}\sim 3\overline{b}(l7\theta^{\delta}),$ $3Z7-\sigma 3\mathcal{L}$, $\zeta+]$ $SCl\forall J.6(\sim Zoo7)\rho 3\dashv 03$
$[f]$ $M\alpha fk$ . $Ia_{P^{0h}}3_{\sim^{\eta(\int q\theta L)}}\Re 3rightarrow Vl$A $[.\zeta]$ Ma th. $J_{a\mu}\iota’\iota,9/\zeta l\oint\theta S)4t\mu\varphi$
$[q]M_{A\{}\backslash .J_{A}t^{n}\sim 3fl(I77*),$ $/bl/\eta 4$. $\beta$ ] $SC\text{ },J\zeta f(\sim 2.\mu p\eta$)
$,$
$3/-\ni i$
$[\#]$ To $\eta\mu\triangleright|.$ }) $\sqrt A,$ $XN\zeta uo\eta$]
$ $\cdot$2U $umon\iota aAo\kappa x,$ $TovowA\kappa\iota,$ $OlA1\zeta A$, 500-0002, $JAPA\aleph$ ,
FAX: $+81*68\Re 2\theta 14$ $B\cdot u.$An: $\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}.saq.ne.jp$
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